Between July and December 2025, more than 900,000 Cambodians returned home from Thailand due to the border conflict — the largest forced return of migrant workers the country has seen in recent decades. Most left informal Thai employment that was also sustaining their families.
Cambodia’s government says it has solved the returnee problem by moving quickly to organize job-matching programmes. It announced that more than 600,000 returnees had been placed in employment.
Research by three respected organisations highlights however, that the returnee situation is far from solved.
Key findings:
- A third of returnees have been unable to find work
- Incomes are half Thai earnings, among those who have found work
- Most returnees in work are earning less than half their monthly expenses
- Seven out of ten returnee households are in debt
- Only one in ten returnees initially wanted to remigrate, but that has spiked to half.
‘From Policy to Practice’, a report published by the Center for Alliance of Labor and Human Rights (CENTRAL), a Non-Governmental Organization (NGO), was quickly rejected by the Government. The report “lacks accuracy,” H.E. Sun Mesa, Spokesman for the Ministry of Labor and Vocational Training, said in the Khmer Times, 26 March. He declined to present any alternative data on incomes, debt, or living conditions.
The Government’s cites a policy briefing by the Cambodia Development Resource Institute (CDRI). This does confirm that large-scale job-matching initiatives have had a degree of success and acknowledges government efforts. However, CDRI’s findings, also reveal a concerning economic picture that mirrors other findings.
CDRI found that average monthly income dropped sharply after return, falling from $431 earned in Thailand to $269 back in Cambodia. Only 43% of employed returnees reported earning over $210 per month. Around 70% of households surveyed carried outstanding debt. Of these, 83% reported difficulty repaying loans on time. Some 78% of households had no savings at all.
CDRI’s Reintegration Index (measuring access to training, social protection, and institutional support) scored just 38%. Hardly a picture of successful reintegration by any reasonable measure.
In April, The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) published an assessment that supports these NGO findings. It found that unemployment among returnees rose from 22% before displacement to 51% after return. Individual earnings on average, fell by nearly half, from $409 per month in Thailand to $200 back in Cambodia. 87% of households reported lower incomes than before.
CDRI concluded that, “a considerable share of returnees remains unemployed or economically vulnerable, and many of the jobs obtained are temporary, informal, or not aligned with workers’ prior skills.” Its key recommendation was that, reintegration must move beyond employment numbers, toward productivity and income recovery.
A job placement is not the same as economic recovery. Placing a worker in a low-paid, informal, or temporary position does not eliminate debt, restore food security, or prevent unsafe re-migration. CENTRAL’s survey of 527 returned workers, found that average monthly household income after return was just $64, against average monthly expenses of $173. Debt was running at 71%, and 85% of those could not keep up with loan repayments. These findings broadly reflect the CDRI’s data.
The government’s 600,000 figure measures the number of people processed through job-matching systems. It does not measure whether those workers now have stable incomes, whether their debts are being managed, whether their children remain in school, or whether they feel compelled to migrate again through irregular and potentially dangerous channels.
CENTRAL’s data found that about half of returnees surveyed, planned to migrate again. Up sharply from 13% recorded in August 2025. That trajectory is not consistent with successful reintegration.
It is worth noting, that neither CENTRAL nor CDRI denied that the Government responded to the crisis. What their findings call into question however, is whether a job-placement count is an adequate measure of whether that response has worked. The evidence here, suggests it has not, at least not yet. In light of this, is it useful for the Government to contest the methodology, rather than engage with the challenges revealed?
What CENTRAL, CDRI and the UNDP highlight, is a need to move beyond job-placement counts and start measuring whether lives are actually recovering. That means taking debt seriously, improving job quality, and strengthening social protection systems. It also requires ensuring that returning workers, especially women (who make up the majority), have genuine pathways to stability, rather than just formal registration in a government placement scheme.
Dismissing evidence does not make hardship disappear. It only delays the support that vulnerable families urgently need. Cambodia has an opportunity to lead on dignified, evidence-based reintegration. That opportunity is best seized by engaging seriously with data, including data that is inconvenient.
References
1. Khmer Times — Labor Ministry responds to CENTRAL survey report: khmertimeskh.com
2. CENTRAL — From Policy to Practice (Impact Assessment Report): central-cambodia.org
3. CDRI — Economic Reintegration Policy Brief: cdri.org.kh
