From 24-27 December 2025, Cambodia and Thailand are again meeting under the General Border Committee (GBC) framework to discuss a ceasefire. The talks could lead to a defence ministers meeting on 27 December, even as fighting continues and both sides accuse each other of violations.
A ceasefire is urgently needed. But there is a real risk that this four-day window becomes a political and military waiting game, especially for Thailand. With a fixed decision moment on 27 December, the incentive is straightforward. Build leverage before that day, then accept a ceasefire only after the battlefield and the bargaining table have been shaped in Thailand favour.
This risk grows because Thailand is entering an election season. Anutin Charnvirakul has been selected as his party’s prime minister candidate for the snap election on 8 February 2026, and nationalism linked to the conflict could strengthen his political standing.
This context matters for how we read the GBC process this week. Many Cambodians fear the language of ceasefire can be used as cover for pressure on the ground, pressure at the table, and pressure in the international narrative. In that view, the goal is not a fair ceasefire. The goal is a ceasefire that locks in advantage.
At least four scenarios could emerge from GBC Meeting:
Scenario 1: Thailand gains leverage then accepts a ceasefire. In this scenario, Thailand uses the days before 27 December to improve its position. The aim is to enter the defence ministers stage with stronger control, or at least stronger claims of control, especially in disputed areas. Another part of the strategy is to weaken Cambodia’s ability to respond by disrupting supply routes and nearby support capacity, so Cambodian forces struggle to rotate, resupply, or stabilise the frontline.
Not every battlefield claim can be verified in real time, but the incentive structure is clear. If Thailand believes it can gain ground or degrade Cambodian capacity before 27 December, then agreeing to a ceasefire on 27 December becomes attractive because a ceasefire can freeze a new reality.
This is also the best political outcome for Anutin. He can campaign as the leader who defended Thai interests, pushed Cambodia to accept Thai terms, and then delivered calm.
If this scenario happens, the ceasefire may look positive in headlines but risky in substance. It can lock in disadvantage for Cambodia and encourage future crises, because the lesson becomes simple. Pressure first, then peace.
Scenario 2: Cambodia refuses the outcome and Thailand blames Cambodia. In this scenario, Cambodia rejects a ceasefire package that reflects Thai demands more than balanced compromise. Thailand then shifts to a narrative strategy. It claims Cambodia lacks commitment to end hostilities. It insists Cambodia must accept Thai demands first. It also tries to limit outside involvement by arguing the issue is bilateral and third parties are unnecessary.
This scenario is powerful because it weaponises the language of peace. Cambodia is portrayed as blocking calm. Thailand portrays itself as seeking only ceasefire and verification. In a high mistrust environment, blame narratives spread fast.
The danger for Cambodia is that blame campaigns can weaken international support if Cambodia does not respond with calm, consistent messaging. The danger for Thailand is that this approach can prolong conflict, increase casualties, and deepen reputational costs.
Scenario 3: A real ceasefire that follows the Kuala Lumpur Accord. This is the most desirable and also the most practical scenario because it relies on an existing commitment made in Kuala Lumpur on 26 October 2025.
The Kuala Lumpur Joint Declaration includes two points that matter now. It reaffirms commitment to implement agreements reached through the GBC, and it sets a Terms of Reference (ToR) for an ASEAN Observer Team (AOT) to help ensure full and effective ceasefire implementation. A ceasefire aligned with that accord would rest on balance and verification. Balance means the ceasefire starts at the same time for both sides. The rules apply equally. There is no one sided demand that only one party must act first.
Verification means observers have a clear mandate, clear methods, and enough access to record facts. The AOT is meant to be a mechanism, not a slogan. If the GBC week ends with agreement to activate that observer mechanism quickly and fairly, it becomes harder for either side to use talks as cover for battlefield gains, and harder to blame the other side without evidence.
This scenario also helps Thailand reduce external pressure. China and other actors have urged a return to ceasefire. A verified ceasefire backed by ASEAN mechanisms allows Thailand to show it is responding to regional expectations rather than resisting them. Most importantly, this scenario saves lives and reduces displacement. It offers border communities a path back to normal life.
Scenario 4: GBC fails and the conflict continues into the election period. If the 27 December meeting fails to produce a credible outcome, the conflict may continue and pressure from regional and international actors will likely grow. Thailand’s election calendar may still push leaders toward a hard line, with some betting that pressure will soften after a new government forms following the 8 February 2026 election.
This is the worst scenario for ordinary people. It prolongs suffering, deepens mistrust, and makes any future agreement harder. Every day of fighting creates new grievances, and new grievances become political fuel.
What Cambodia should insist in this meeting?
If Cambodia wants to prevent talks from becoming time buying, it should anchor its position in one clear principle. The ceasefire must be equal, verifiable, and linked to the Kuala Lumpur commitments. Equal means simultaneous commitments and no one-sided preconditions. Verifiable means the AOT mechanism is activated with real access and clear procedures, consistent with the Kuala Lumpur ToR. Linked means the GBC outcome is not only a headline but a sequence. It should include a ceasefire start time, verification steps, communication channels, and a timeline for follow up.
Cambodia should also communicate carefully. It should not reject ceasefire language. It should support ceasefire strongly while rejecting only unfair terms. The message should be calm and consistent. Cambodia wants peace. Cambodia wants the Kuala Lumpur Accord implemented. Cambodia wants verification that protects both sides from propaganda and protects civilians from renewed fighting. A ceasefire is not a gift from one side to the other. It is a joint commitment to stop the harm. If the GBC week delivers a ceasefire shaped by battlefield leverage and election politics, the conflict will return again. If it delivers a ceasefire shaped by balance, verification, and the Kuala Lumpur Accord, it can become a real turning point.
