The momentum of regional politics in Southeast Asia is reaching a major turning point as Thailand prepares for the general election on February 8, 2026, an event that not only affects Thailand’s internal stability but is also a major determinant of the fate of bilateral relations with Cambodia. Relations between Bangkok and Phnom Penh have plummeted to the lowest point ever in more than a decade after the outbreak of a serious border conflict in 2025, caused by a combination of ultra-nationalism, Thai internal political crisis, and the breakdown of the personal friendship between the most influential political families of the two countries. An in-depth analysis of this situation requires an understanding of the recent historical context, particularly the collapse of the “brotherhood diplomacy” between Mr. Thaksin Shinawatra and Mr. Hun Sen, which was once a pillar of stability but has now become a source of tension and mistrust.
The foundation of the current crisis can be traced back to June 2025, when a 17-minute telephone conversation between Ms. Paetongtarn Shinawatra, then Thai Prime Minister, and Mr. Hun Sen, President of the Cambodian Senate, was leaked to the public. In that conversation, Ms. Paetongtarn used respectful language, calling Mr. Hun Sen “Uncle,” and expressed criticism of her own military commanders, who were considered political enemies. This leak not only led to accusations of treason and demeaning herself before a foreign leader but also led to her removal by the Thai Constitutional Court on August 29, 2025, on the grounds of violating ethics and allowing external interference. This event officially ended the “godbrother” relationship between Mr. Thaksin and Mr. Hun Sen, with Mr. Thaksin publicly announcing that his friendship with the Cambodian leader was over due to what he considered an act of betrayal and damage to his daughter’s political future.
This personal tension quickly spread into a territorial dispute when both sides began using nationalism to strengthen their respective political legitimacy. For Cambodia, a show of strength along the border was a means to divert public attention from economic issues and international criticism regarding cyber-scam centers. Meanwhile, in Thailand, the Bhumjaithai Party, led by Mr. Anutin Charnvirakul, seized this opportunity to portray themselves as defenders of national sovereignty by leaving the alliance with the Pheu Thai Party and forming a caretaker government supported by the military and conservative forces. This situation created a political environment where peaceful negotiations were seen as a sign of weakness, leading to armed clashes that became increasingly lethal and prolonged.
The 2025 crisis was not just a typical border clash, but a large-scale war using modern military technology. The Royal Thai Air Force deployed F-16 fighter jets to attack Cambodian military positions, the first use of airpower since the Thai-Laos border war in the 1980s. According to military reports, the Thai side claimed control over several strategic locations within Cambodian territory. This action was condemned by Cambodia as an invasion and a serious violation of territorial integrity.
The loss of life and the displacement of citizens created a massive humanitarian crisis. In Oddar Meanchey province, 84 villages are still unable to be re-inhabited, while in Banteay Meanchey province, more than 2,700 families still live in temporary shelters. The issue of landmines and unexploded ordnance remaining from the fighting has become an obstacle to the return of people and the restoration of the agricultural sector. Furthermore, the psychological impact of the war has created mutual hatred between the peoples of the two countries, further fueled by information warfare and fake news on social media. This shows that even if a ceasefire is implemented, rebuilding trust between civil societies will take a long time.
The economic consequences of this conflict have spread beyond the border areas, affecting the macroeconomic stability of both countries and global supply chains. The closure of major border crossings, especially the Poipet-Klong Luek gate, stalled cross-border trade valued at approximately $4.7 billion per year. Thailand, which supplies up to 90% of fuel and agricultural chemicals to Cambodia, caused Cambodian factories and agricultural activities to be suspended due to energy shortages. Conversely, Thailand’s starch, alcohol, and steel manufacturing industries suffered from a lack of raw materials like cassava and scrap metal imported from Cambodia.
The technology manufacturing sector, particularly computer parts—for which Thailand is a major global production hub—was severely affected. The departure of approximately 780,000 Cambodian workers from Thailand in a short period caused severe labor shortages in factories supplying giants like Nidec and Yazaki. As a result, the price of computer parts on the global market surged between 40% and 50% in just six months. According to projections by the University of the Thai Chamber of Commerce, if the crisis continues, Thailand’s GDP could drop by 0.74% in 2026. For Cambodia, the loss of overseas worker remittances worth more than $3 billion a year is a serious blow to the livelihoods of hundreds of thousands of families and domestic demand.
The election on February 8, 2026, is a massive test for Thai democracy and foreign relations. According to the latest poll data, the Prachachon Party (People’s Party), the successor to the Move Forward Party, is the leading candidate with strong support from youth and urban populations. However, the border conflict has become an obstacle for them, as conservative rivals have used the issue to accuse the Prachachon Party of being “unpatriotic” or having plans to reduce the military power necessary for border defense. In response, the Prachachon Party shifted its strategy to focus on “Elegance Diplomacy” and showcased a team of experts ready to take the role of Foreign Minister to build confidence that they can resolve the crisis with Cambodia without compromising sovereignty.
The Bhumjaithai Party, under the leadership of Mr. Anutin Charnvirakul, built its power base around the image of a “wartime leader.” Their strategy is to use the border issue to demonstrate the necessity of increasing military budgets and tightening security—a trend that has gained support from conservative forces and voters concerned about stability. Meanwhile, the Pheu Thai Party is seen to be in a state of sharp decline following the fall of the Shinawatra clan and the loss of public trust regarding secret negotiations with Mr. Hun Sen. Polls show that nearly 21% of voters remain undecided, and this group will determine the final outcome of Thailand’s upcoming election.
In a context where bilateral relations are almost completely severed, the role of external mediators has become indispensable. China has played an active role through “quiet diplomacy” and the use of economic and military influence over both countries. A trilateral meeting in Yunnan province in December 2025 showed Beijing’s ambition to be a “problem solver” in the region, suggesting that the conflict is a legacy of Western colonialism that must be resolved in an Asian spirit. China provided humanitarian aid to refugees and gave guarantees for a ceasefire agreement to protect the supply chains of the Belt and Road projects threatened by the war.
Conversely, the United States under the Donald Trump administration used a “maximum pressure” strategy to force a ceasefire. Mr. Trump expressed concern and urged both sides to respect the Kuala Lumpur agreements, using trade and tax issues as pressure tools on Mr. Anutin’s government. For ASEAN, this crisis is a major test of its relevance. While Malaysia, as the 2025 ASEAN Chair, made great efforts through mediation diplomacy, the transfer of the mandate to the Philippines in 2026 could see attention on the Cambodia-Thailand conflict decline, as the Philippines will likely focus on the South China Sea issue. ASEAN’s institutional weakness in resolving military disputes between its own members was evidenced by its heavy reliance on the will of the rotating chair rather than permanent mechanisms.
Scenario 1
In a scenario where the Prachachon Party wins a landslide victory and can form a government, we will see a fundamental shift in the approach to resolving the conflict with Cambodia. The new government is likely to shift from a relationship based on individuals, which failed in the past, to a relationship based on institutions and the law. The possibility of restoring relations in this scenario is highly positive in the long run but will face short-term turmoil. The Prachachon government might propose sending the border issue to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) again or using international arbitration to end the conflict fueled by nationalism.
However, the biggest obstacle to this scenario is opposition from the Thai military, which might view de-escalating tensions with Cambodia as weakening national security. If the Prachachon Party attempts to cut the military budget or reform the military structure along the border, the military could use Cambodia as a “demon” to create instability leading to a coup or party dissolution. For Cambodia, dealing with a government led by the Prachachon Party will be more technical and strict, which might not be as easy as “family-style” talk, but it will be stronger and more predictable. Restoring trade and opening border gates will be the first priority to resolve the economic crisis hindering the growth of both countries.
Scenario 2
If the election result leads to the formation of a coalition government led by the Bhumjaithai Party and other conservative parties, relations with Cambodia will continue in a state of “managed tension.” In this scenario, Mr. Anutin will continue to use the border issue as a political tool to maintain support from nationalist forces. Restoring relations will be slow and focused only on sectors that provide clear economic benefits, such as negotiations on the Overlapping Claims Area (OCA) to extract natural gas. The possibility of small-scale military clashes remains if Thai internal political temperatures rise.
However, economic factors might force the Thai conservative government to soften its stance. The lack of hundreds of thousands of Cambodian workers and protests from the Thai private sector, which has lost billions of baht, will be pressure to reopen the border. In this scenario, relations will be heavily mediated through the military and the General Border Committee rather than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Cambodia is likely to maintain a hardline stance in demanding Thailand withdraw troops from newly occupied areas, which could leave relations in a stalemate of “neither war nor peace.”
Scenario 3
The third and most concerning scenario is if the election fails to produce a stable government or leads to a new political crisis in Thailand. If the Prachachon Party wins the election but is blocked from forming a government by non-elected forces, the chaos in Bangkok will provide an opportunity for the border conflict to expand. In such a situation, the Thai military institution would hold full decision-making power over the border, which could lead to a greater use of force to divert attention from domestic protests.
The possibility of restoring relations in this scenario would depend almost entirely on intervention from major powers, especially China. We might see Cambodia turn even more toward China for military and economic protection, while Thailand might be forced to make concessions in other sectors in exchange for China’s mediation with Cambodia. The greatest danger is that the Cambodia-Thailand border issue becomes part of the geopolitical game between China and the US, threatening the sovereignty of both countries. In this scenario, the restoration of relations would be artificial and extremely fragile, as it does not stem from the genuine will of the leaders of both countries.
One issue that erupted in January 2026 was the allegation of Cambodian interference in the Thai election process. A statement by Mr. Keo Remy, a senior Cambodian official, calling on Thai voters to support the Prachachon Party and the Pheu Thai Party to avoid war, became fuel poured onto the fire of Thai nationalism. The Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs strongly condemned it as a violation of the ASEAN Charter and an impact on the independence of the democratic process. This event shows that even before the election began, Cambodia was already drawn into Thailand’s “internal political battlefield.”
This leads to a rhetorical war where both sides have used digital media to spread misinformation. Thailand broadcast that the attacks on Cambodian territory were a “war against scams” to gain international support, especially from the US. Meanwhile, Cambodia used the rhetoric of peace and appeals to the international community to portray itself as a victim of aggression from a stronger neighbor. Restoring relations will require a specific agreement on “stopping the information war,” as stated in the December 2025 joint statement, but practical implementation remains a major challenge.
The Overlapping Claims Area (OCA) is both a time bomb and a key to peace. With untapped natural resource values of approximately $280 billion, it is the biggest economic driver for a new post-election government. Restoring better relations could occur in the form of “Economic Peace,” where both sides agree to set aside land border issues and focus on sharing maritime energy interests. However, technical and political obstacles are very complex.
- First is the maritime boundary delimitation involving Koh Kut. Thai nationalist groups have accused maritime negotiations of potentially leading to the loss of sovereignty over this island, even though international law provides clarity.
- Second is the decision of whether to negotiate the border issue and the sharing of benefits simultaneously or separately. Cambodia previously wanted benefits sharing first, while Thailand (under conservative governments) has always demanded clear boundary delimitation first. If a new government from the Prachachon Party takes power, they might propose greater transparency in negotiations, which could help reduce suspicions of “selling out the nation,” but it could also make negotiations slower due to required oversight from parliament and the public.
In summary, the possibility of restoring Cambodia-Thailand relations after February 8, 2026, lies in a fragile balance between economic pragmatism and nationalist pride. The presence of a new government that prioritizes institutions over individuals will offer an opportunity for long-term stability, but it must pass the obstacle of deep-rooted Thai military influence. For Cambodia, learning to live with a neighbor undergoing profound structural political changes is a challenge that requires high diplomatic flexibility.
If we examine the impact on ASEAN, this conflict has clearly shown that “ASEAN Peace” is merely an illusion if members do not have mechanisms to enforce compliance with the law. Restoring relations is not just a bilateral task, but a restoration of the regional spirit destroyed by bullets and words. The future of the Poipet border crossing, the maritime overlapping claims area, and the livelihoods of millions of workers will be decided by 53 million Thai voters and the will of new leaders to choose “shared prosperity” over “winning or losing over uninhabited land.” The outlook for this relationship is likely to start with a “cold peace” filled with caution before reaching full cooperation if a scenario of political stability is achieved.
Monitoring these indicators during the first 100 days of Thailand’s new government will provide the clearest answer to the question of whether Cambodia-Thailand relations will move toward a new golden age or continue in an endless crisis. The experience of 2025 has shown that the cost of war is too high for fragile economies, and the only choice for a strong Southeast Asia is diplomatic compromise based on mutual interest and mutual respect.
